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COAL MINING RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
IN WEST VIkGINIA*
ROBERT Tuci DONLEY*"
The purpose of this article is to collect, organize and discuss
all the West Virginia cases dealing with mining rights and privileges
in connection with the ownership and production of coal. The
words "rights and privileges" while possibly inaccurate as a matter
of legal terminology,1 have become so fixed in usage as to preclude
the substitution of other words.
One is struck with the fact that, with the exception of com-
paratively minor statutory regulations, 2 the body of the law upon
this subject is contained in the cases; and that, in a state where coal
mining has long been a major industry, these cases are few in
number. As will be hereinafter shown, many questions remain
undecided, some of which have a social impact not limited to the
litigating parties.
The problems in this field nearly always arise out of a contest
between the owner of the coal, or his lessee, and the owner of the
overlying strata; although there are a few cases in which the owner
ol the underlying strata asserts claims. The mining of coal involves
several operations more or less distinct in themselves yet all part
of the entire plan of production: (a) the exploratory stage, i.e., by
core-drilling or other means of obtaining samples for testing thick-
ness, quality, chemical analysis, and the like in order to predict
the economic feasibility of the proposed operation; (b) the use of
the surface for the construction of tipples, tramways, railroads or
highways, loading facilities, washing and sizing equipment, belt-
haulage systems, and such other devices as are developed from time
to time in the progressive mechanization of the industry; (c) the
taking of trees, stone or other components of the surface for mine
props, timbering and construction; (d) the use of the surface for
offices, supply houses, shops, miners' houses, stores, and other
* Copyright by Robert T. Donley, 1950. This article is the tentative draft
of a chapter of a book now in preparation by the author.
** Professor of law, West Virginia University; member of the Monongalia
County bar.
I KOcOUREK, JURAL RELATION C. II (1927).
2 See W. VA. CODE c. 22, art. 4 (Michie, 1943) (relating to drilling thxough
coal for oil and gas).
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structures; (e) the use of the surface for the purpose of depositing
"gob" and other waste materials; (f) the overflowing of part of
the surface with mine water, either draining naturally or pumped
thereon.
One group of cases deals with problems arising out of this
scheme of production, all of which may be possible without involv-
ing questions of a quite different nature. Another group of cases
concerns the rights and duties of the parties when the removal of
the coal results in the subsidence of the overlying strata, thereby
causing damage to it or to something on it. A third group involves
the right to use the passageways remaining after removal of the
coal.
It is quite plain that all these conflicting rights can be settled
by the contracting parties if they have the opportunity and fore-
sight to do so. In view of the Continental Coal Company3 case,
hereinafter discussed, it would seem to be settled that there is no
pilblic policy, either judicially declared or legislatively enacted,
against the owner's consent to the waste or destruction of a vein 4 of
coal; certainly there is none against damage to the surface or other
overlying strata. A typical set of mining rights is quoted in the
opinion in Sycamore Coal Co. v. Adkins.5 Following the granting
clause and description of the property, it is provided:
together with the full and complete rights and
privileges of every kind for mining, manufacturing and trans-
porting such minerals and other substances on, through, and
over the said premises, and in particular the right of exploring
for, extracting, sorting, handling and defining the said minerals
and other substances; and also with full rights of way to, from
and over said premises by the construction and use of roads,
tramways, railroads or otherwise for the purpose of exploring,
extracting, storing, hauling, manufacturing, refining, shipping
or transporting all of said minerals or any other substances,
whether contained on said premises or elsewhere and for any
other purpose whatever, and with the full right to take and
use all water and stone on said lands, and with the full right
3 104 W. Va. 44, 138 S. E. 737 (1927).
4 Geologists insist that the correct terminology is "seam". However, usage
of the terms interchangeably has become inveterate and is sanctioned by
WFB=sTR's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY: "Seam. A thin layer or stratum. Of
coal or other valuable mineral, a bed, not necessarily thin." "Vein. d. A bed; as
a vein of coal."
5 101 W. Va. 211, 155 S. E. 330 (1926).
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to take and use all timber, except merchantable timber over
eighteen inches in diameter ... required for any of the above
purposes."
In addition, it is common to provide that all such operations
shall be conducted without liability for damage to the overlying
surface, or to anything therein or thereon, or to the springs and
watercourses thereof and, in the more modern deeds, a grant of
express stripping rights.
In the absence of such provisions, the court must determine
the claims of the parties. The familiar approach is by way of the
proposition that certain rights and privileges need not be expressly
granted or reserved with the coal but attach thereto as an incident
of ownership.
1. MINING RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES INCIDENT TO OWNERSHIP OF COAL
The ownership of coal carries with it certain privileges, as an
attribute or incident of ownership, without the necessity of an
express grant or exception thereof. This principle is most clearly
enunciated in Squires v. Lafferty,0 in which 0, the owner in fee of
137 acres of land, conveyed 51 acres thereof by deed of "the sur-
face" to X and excepted and reserved "the privilege and right of
mining all minerals under said surface." X conveyed 27 acres of the
land to the plaintiff. 0 then conveyed to the defendant's predeces-
sors in title the surface of an adjoining tract (part of the original
157 acres). Later 0 conveyed to plaintiff coal company all the
minerals underlying both tracts. The owner of the coal desired to
core-drill for testing purposes and, in order to do so, it was necessary
to pass over a road on defendant's land with its equipment. The
defendant refused permission to do so and threatened plaintiff's
cmployees with violence. There was no other convenient way of
access and no evidence of any injury to defendant's land. It was
held that the defendant may be enjoined from obstructing the
plaintiff, that, as an incident to ownership of the coal, the owner
possesses "the right to use the surface in such manner and with
such means as would be fairly necessary to the enjoyment of the
mineral estate" and that this rule "is based upon the principle that
when a thing is granted all the means to obtain it and all the fruits
and effects of it are also granted."7 The court relied in part upon
6 95 W. Va. 307, 121 S. E. 90 (1924).
7 Id. at 309, 121 S. E. at 91.
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the analogous case of Porter v. Mack Manufacturing Co.,8 which
iecognized and enforced the right of the owner of fire-clay to use
the overlying surface for the purpose of removing the same by
means of tramways. In that case, there was the express reservation
of "the right to mine and remove the same" but it was said that
such right, if not express, would be implied and that the owner of
the surface is entitled to subjacent support.
In Armstrong v. Pinnacle Coal &c Coke Co.,9 one question raised
was whether the lessee of coal has the right to erect poles for the
transmission of electric power upon overlying surface owned by
another. Neither the terms of the severance deed nor those of the
lease are reported. The court said that the evidence did not dis-
close a right in the lessee to locate its poles on the plaintiff's lands.
Apparently, the lessee did not claim such rights as incident to the
ownership of the coal but contended that the poles were erected
on a road. It was held that such use of a road, without permission
from any official body, imposes a new and additional burden on
the abutting owner. Under the reported facts, this case cannot
be considered as authority for the proposition that the owner of
coal has no right whatsoever to erect power poles as incidental to
his ownership. The rule of the Squires case makes the decision of
this question depend upon whether such poles would be "fairly
neeessary to the enjoyment of the mineral estate"-a question of
fact in each case.
Erecting of Structures and Other Uses of the Surface. It may
be said, generally, that any rights and privileges reserved and
excepted, or granted, must be exercised reasonably and with due
regard for the interests of the party upon whom the burden is
imposed. Thus, in McKell v. Collins Colliery Co.,10 the lessor
in a coal mining lease expressly reserved an easement over and
through the leased premises for any railroads or wagon roads that
might be required for the further development of any of the
property of the lessor; and the lease further provided that the
lessee should locate its improvements on the surface so as to permit
convenient entry over the same to the tracks of any railway com-
pany to which the lessor might grant an easement. After the
8 65 W. Va. 636, 64 S. E. 853 (1909).
9 101 W. Va. 15, 131 S. E. 865 (1926).
10 46 W. Va. 625, 33 S. E. 765 (1897).
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lessee had erected buildings and other improvements, the lessor
gave notice of the location of a proposed route which would inter-
fere with the lessee's operations. It was held that the lessor, while
en'titled to locate the reserved easment, cannot select an unreason-
able place which would cause unnecessary injury to the lessee.
The principle of the Squires case extends to the case of a lease
of coal. 1 But, if the lessor excepts and reserves from the operation
of the lease "surface right" of part of the land for burial and ceme-
tery purposes, the lessee has no right to use any part thereof even
though the lessor has not yet devoted the land to such purposes.12
Ordinarily, if the location of an easement is not definitely
described and the grantee is given the right to locate it, such loca-
tion cannot be changed without the consent of the owner of the
servient estate. However, as between the lessor and lessee of a coal
lease, if the lessee, having located a water pipe line and finding it
necessary to relocate the same in order to perform the covenants
of the lease, makes such new location at great expense and main-
tains it for a period of two years or more with no objection by the
lessor, the lessee may enjoin interference therewith and the prosecu-
tion of suits for damages arising therefrom. 3
It is common to provide in coal leases that the lessee shall have
the right to cut and use timber on the leased land when necessary
in connection with mining operations. In some instances, the size
of such timber is specified, e.g., in Raleigh Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mankin,"4 as not over twenty inches in diameter, one foot from the
ground. It was held that such size is determinable as of the dates
when such cutting and use becomes necessary in the process of
mining. The lease vests no title to the timber in the lessee but a
mere right to cut and use the same when necessary.
The "necessity" of use of such timber is not unlimited, under
a lease permitting the lessee to use "so much of the timber on said
lands as may be required for mining said minerals and removing
them from said land." Such right is an irrevocable license, coupled
with an interest, said the court, in Sun Lumber Co. v. Nelson Fuel
11 See Montgomery v. Economy Fuel Co., 61 W. Va. 620, 624, 57 S. E. 137,
J39 (1907).
12 Ibid.
13 Mary Helen Coal Co. v. Hatfield. 75 W. Va. 148, 83 S. E. 292 (1914).
1 83 W. Va. 54, 97 S. E. 299 (1918).
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Co.,'5 but the use thereof must be confined to that having a direct
connection with the mining operations and does not confer the
right to use the timber for the purpose of building miners' houses,
store houses, churches, schools, and houses of entertainment for the
prospective employees of the lessee. In this case, after the making
of the lease, the lessor conveyed to third persons all the timber
twelve inches or more in diameter, to be cut and removed within
a stipulated time. It was held that this includes only timber of
that dimension when the deed was delivered.
In a case in which a deed conveys minerals, with full mining
rights and the full right to take and use all timber for mining
purposes, excepting merchantable timber over eighteen inches in
diameter found on so much of the premises as lies within a
designated area, the right of the grantee so to take and use all timber
under such size was enforced by injunction granted to the lessee
of such rights.'6
Sometimes the parties to a coal lease fail to state clearly their
rights with reference to improvements placed upon the premises
by the lessee. In- Pocahontas Coal & Coke Co. v. By-Products Poca-
hontas Co.,'7 the lease provided that, in the event of termination
cf the lease otherwise than by forfeiture, the lessee might remove
the improvements, no provision being made in the event of termi-
nation by forfeiture. It was held, as a matter of interpretation, that
by necessary implication, there was no right of removal in the
event of forfeiture. The court said, by way of dictum, that, had
there been no provision whatsoever, the presumption is that, in a
long-term lease, improvements are intended to be permanent. The
court also stated the principles determining when machinery and
equipment become irremovable fixtures.
Interpretation of Express Mining Rights. The grant of the
"privilege" to remove coal is a grant of the coal itself in place rather
than the grant of a right to remove such coal in common with the
grantor. But, by apt language, the right to remove such coal may
be limited to doing so by openings upon a specified tract.'8
15 88 W. Va. 61, 106 S.-E. 41 (1921).
16 Sycamore Coal Co. v. Adkins, 101 W. Va. 211, 133 S. E. 330 (1926).
'7 112 W. Va. 390, 164 S. E. 504 (1932).
18 Higgins v. Round Bottom Coal & Coke Co., 63 W. Va. 218, 59 S. E.
1064 (1907).
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After making an executory contract to purchase coal, the
vendee can not make unreasonable demands for mining rights,
especially when he had prior knowledge of the character of such
rights owned by the vendor and which are reasonably adequate x9
In Armstrong v. Pinnacle Coal & Coke Co., the lessee of the
coal and the owner of a part of the surface both traced title to a
partition deed which provided that "subterranean and surface
rights of way to the Kanawha River to get a perfect dainage of
coal banks shall attach and is hereby granted forever. ... but
drainage ways shall be constructed as to be reasonable and to do
no more injury to land than can be reasonably avoided. . . .with
the least possible detriment to others." The lessee found it neces-
sary to change the location of a drainage way so that mine water
flowed onto the surface owner's land and damaged a water well.
it was held that, while the lessee had the right to relocate the drain-
age channel, it had not done so with due regard to the rights of
the surface owner as provided in the partition deed and, for failure
so to do, was liable for damages.
The owner of coal, draining mine water therefrom over
adjacent lands under oral permission from the life tenant thereof,
can not acquire a prescriptive easement so to do; but the remainder-
man, although in actual possession with the consent of the life
tenant, is but a tenant at sufferance. He can recover for per-
manent, but not for temporary, damages to his reversionary interest
in the land caused by such drainage. 0
The law as to stripping rights is undoubtedly inconclusive. It
seems plain that, when such rights have been expressly excepted
from a grant of the surface, the landowner cannot prevent the
mining of the coal in that manner, at least "in the absence of
statutory inhibition, fraud or other vitiating circumstances." 21
The court will take judicial notice of the strip mining law but, in
the absence of an allegation of noncompliance therewith, such
noncompliance cannot be relied upon as a ground for enjoining
stripping operations. The question thus remains open as to
whether the owner of the surface may prevent stripping upon the
ground of noncompliance with the statute.
19 Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co., 67 W. Va. 589, 69 S. E. 195 (1910).
20 Swick v. West Virginia Coal & Coke Co., 122 W. Va. 151, 7 S. E.2d 697
(1940).
21 Tokas v. J. J. Arnold Co., 122 W. Va. 613, 11 S. E.2d 759 (1940).
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In West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong,22 the deed in
1904 severing the coal from the surface contained the following
comprehensive mining rights:
"Together with the right to enter upon and under said
land with employees, animals and machinery at convenient
point and points, and to mine, dig, excavate and remove all
said coal and the coal from other land and lands and to make
and maintain on said land all necessary and convenient
structures, roads, ways, and tramways, railroads, switches, exca-
vations, air-shafts, drains and openings, for such mining, re-
moval and conveying of all coal aforesaid, with the exclusive
use of all such rights of way and privileges aforesaid, including
right to deposit mine refuse on said land and waiving all
claims for injury or damage done by such mining and removal
of coal aforesaid and use of such privileges.
"All of the surface of the said land occupied or used by
[the grantees] or their assigns, above the level of the Pittsburgh
#8 vein of coal, for their operations herein shall be paid for
before the same shall be so used, or occupied, at the rate of
One Hundred Dollars per acre, and said party of the first part,
his heirs or assigns shall execute and deliver a deed therefor,
in fee simple, free from liens and incumbrances, when said
surface shall be taken and paid for."
In a declaratory judgment proceeding, the owner of the coal
sought a declaration of its rights and specific performance of the
covenant to convey the surface. After stating that the bill of
complaint was demurrable by reason of combining such prayers
for relief, the court held that the above-quoted mining rights did
not confer upon the owner of the coal the right to strip the surface.
It was further stated that "the mining rights are expressly granted
and do not rest upon necessary implication as in a case where the
coal is granted without express grant of mining rights, the express
terms of the grant of the rights serving to restrict the rights con-
ferred thereto."23  No authority was cited in support of this
proposition which, in effect, states that mining rights expressly
set forth are in derogation, rather than by way of enlargment, of
mining rights incident to the ownership of coal. It is submitted
that this has not been the common understanding of the profession
but rather that the grantee of the coal, by accepting a deed with
specifically enumerated mining rights does not intend to waive any
22 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E 2d 46 (1947).
23 Id. at 835, 42 S. E.2d. at 49.
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other rights not so enumerated and to which he would be other-
wise entitled as incident to his ownership, under the doctrine of
the Squires case. For example, suppose that the mining rights pro-
vide that the grantee of the coal might erect a tipple. Would he
thereby be precluded from erecting any other structure on the
land, such as a supply house or a blacksmith shop? Or suppose that
there is granted the right to construct a railroad over the surface.
Would the grantee of the coal be denied the right also to con-
struct a road for the use of trucks and automobiles, if such were
fairly necessary to the enjoyment of the mineral estate?
The court went on to hold* that the quoted mining rights
conferred only the privilege of removing the coal "by the usual
method at that time known and accepted as common practice in
Brooke County. We do not believe that this included the practice
known as strip mining."24 This conclusion was further fortified
by the quoted provision for purchase of the surface "occupied or
used."
One is inclined to agree with the decision as a matter of
interpretation of the intention of the parties; but the case leaves
undecided these questions: (1) do such mining rights confer the
privilege to strip if the coal owner can satisfactorily prove that
such was a known and accepted practice at the time of the execu-
tion of the severance deed; (2) if the terrain overlying the coal
is of such character that all, or the major portion thereof, cannot
be practicably mined otherwise than by the strip method, does the
coal owner have the right to use that method upon the ground that
it is "fairly necessary to the enjoyment of the mineral estate"? Upon
this latter point, the dissenting opinion of Judge Fox states:
". .. The majority opinion, in effect, denies what the 1904
deed expressly granted, namely, the right to remove all the
coal then conveyed; for if the coal can be removed only as
alleged in the bill, by the single method, strip mining, now
sought to be employed, the right of the plaintiff to remove its
coal is absolutely destroyed. I can see neither moral nor legal
justification for that inescapable result, but that aspect of the
case does not appear to have been considered by those who
concur in the majority opinion, or, if considered, was not
deemed of sufficient importance to merit discussion.12
24 Id. at 836, 42 S. E.2d at 49.
-5 Id. at 850, 42 S. E.2d at 56.
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Irrespective of the rights which may be granted by the owner
of the surface, the statute20 regulates strip mining by requiring the
operator to give bond and imposing upon him the duty to regrade
the strata removed and otherwise to perform specified operations
upon the land in a manner approved by the department of mines
and the agricultural experiment station of West Virginia Univer-
sity, except as to lands not adapted to agricultural or grazing pur-
poses. Upon noncompliance with the requirements of the law, the
bond is forfeited and the attorney general is directed to collect the
penalty. The proceeds of such collections are credited to the depart-
ment of mines and are expendable for enforcement and administra-
tion of the law for the reclamation of the stripped lands.
It will be noted that the owner does not receive the proceeds
of the forfeited bond and, unless benefited by the reclamation work
of the department of mines, has virtually no protection. It is
therefore necessary, in the granting or leasing of stripping rights,
to make express provision as to the character and extent of soil
replacement and to secure performance thereof by lien, bond or
otherwise.
Removal of Adjacent or Neighboring Coal. In the early case
of Findley v. Armstrongy7 an executory contract for the sale of land
reserving all coal and "all the necessary and desired privileges"
was held not to permit the vendor to insert in the deed a reservation
of the right "to remove on and through this tract of land the coals
of coterminous tracts of land owner by the vendor." Judge Green
reasoned that if such insertions in the deed were permitted "they
would render utterly null and void the entire contract, as it would
render it utterly vague and uncertain in its meaning. Under such
an interpretation of it the vendee could have no possible conception
of what use he could have of the surface. . . . If this had been
expressed on the face of the contract, it would have destroyed it
utterly as a contract; for one of the contracting parties under this
so-called contract would have had just such rights and only such
rights as the other contracting party might choose to permit him
to enjoy. '28 It was also held that parol evidence was inadmissible
20 W. VA. CODE c. 22, art. 2A (Michie Supp. 1947). For collection and
discussion of materials on duty to restore surface, see Note, 1 A. L. R.2d 575
(1948); cf. Note, id. at 787.
2r 23 WV. Va. 113 (1883).
28 Id. at 124-5.
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [1949], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol52/iss1/4
COAL MINING RIGHTS
to show that, when the contract was made, the vendee knew that
the vendor owned coterminous coal which would be greatly lessened
in value unless removable through the tract purchased.
The result reached in this case is probably sound, as a matter
of interpretation of the contract but surely the language of Judge
Green goes too far. It cannot be successfully contended that the
parties can not agree that the vendor of land may expressly reserve
such rights. It has been done in numberless instances and in no
other WAest Virginia case has it been said that such a provision
"utterly destroys" the "so-called contract". Moreover, the objection
of the court being based upon possible over-extensive use of the
surface, the case does not decide what would have been the result
had the proposed reservation omitted the word "on" and used the
word "through" alone, i..e, had the proposed reservation been
limited to underground haulage of coterminous coal-a right which
later cases expressly hold can be created by deed or contract.
If the vendor of the coal is able to convey the right to remove
coal from coterminous tracts, the vendee cannot demand the addi-
tional right to remove other coal thereafter acquired by him.2 9
Where a deed conveying minerals expressly grants the "full and
complete rights and privileges of every kind for mining, manu-
facturing and transporting" the same, "with full rights of way to,
from and over said premises by construction of roads, tramways,
railroads or otherwise" for the purpose of extracting such minerals
"whether contained in the said premises or elsewhere, and for any
other purpose whatsoever, with the full right to take and use all
timber except walnut, poplar and oak over twelve inches in diameter
required for any purposes," it was held that such easement is ap-
purtenant to the minerals and not in gross. The grantee, there-
fore, has the right to construct a tramroad across the surface for
the purpose of hauling timber to be manufactured into lumber to
be used for the purpose of mining the minerals granted, as well as
the minerals produced by the grantee from other lands in connec-
tion with the minerals granted. And the main business of the
grantee being the mining of coal, he has the right to haul excess
timber, not needed in the mining operations."
2 Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co., supra n. 19.
s0 Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 532, 91 S. E. 391 (1917).
11
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It was also pointed out 3' that it is not necessary that the
dominant and servient estates be contiguous or that the easement
granted shall terminate on the dominant estate. However, the
quoted phrase "and for any other purposes whatsoever" was con-
fined by the court "to such purposes as are reasonably necessary
to the production of the coal from such lands as may be owned and
intended to be operated" by the grantee in conjunction with the
tract granted.3 2
Does the owner of a vein of coal also own the space left after
removal of the coal? In Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 33
the defendant owned all the minerals and other strata from the
center of the earth to a stratum of cement rock. The plaintiff
owned the remaining strata up to and including the surface. The
W'heeling vein of coal was located about 30 feet under the cement
rock and the defendant, having mined the coal therefrom, was
using the passageways therein for the transportation of coal from
adjoining lands. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain
such use, alleging that it was a continuing menace to the stability
of the overlying surface and of a vein of coal owned by him. On
demurrer, the injunction was denied, the court holding that the
owner of the coal may use the'passageways therein for the trans-
portation of minerals from adjoining lands. The court quoted 4
with approval a statement of the English rule that "after the
minerals are taken out [the owner] is entitled to the entire and
exclusive user of such space for all purposes."
In an illuminating discussion of the Robinson case, Professor
Simonton, while agreeing with the result reached and conceding
that the decision was in accord with the great weight of authority,
took the position that, in principle, the grantor of a vein of coal
does not intend to convey the containing space and that in anal-
ogous situations a contrary result is reached.35 Referring to cases
-of conveyances of timber, clay, rock and the like, it was said:
"... Certainly in these cases there is a fee simple interest
in the trees, day, rock or coal with the incidental privileges in
31 Id. at 538, 91 S. E. at 394.
32 Id. at 539, 91 S. E. at 394.
33 99 W. Va. 435, 129 S. E. 311 (1925); cf. Note, 47 W. VA. L. Q. 221,
n. 36 (1941) (discussing cited case).
tA See Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 99 W. Va. 435, 436, 129 S. E.
311, 312 (1925).
35 Note, 32 W. VA. L. Q. 242 (1926).
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the containing space essential to enable the owner to enjoy
his property. In these cases it is probable no mineral owner
ever contended he must necessarily own the space in fee merely
because the grant did not expressly provide to the contrary.
Why should there be such a difference merely because the
mineral happens to be far beneath the surface, or in the case
of a vein of coal near the surface, merely because it happens
to have such a roof that it can best be mined by tunnels instead
of by stripping?"' 0
The rule is otherwise in Virginia. Clayborn v. Camilla Red
Ash Coal Co. 37 flatly held that the grantee of the coal has no right
to use the space left after removal of the coal for the transportation
of coal from adjacent tracts. It was conceded that
"... the prevailing, if not wholly unbroken, current of
authority, supports the general proposition that a grantee of
coal in place is the owner, not of an incorporeal right to mine
and remove, but of a corporeal freehold estate in the coal,
including the shell or containing chamber, and that as such
owner he has the absolute right, until all of the coal has been
exhausted, to use the passages opened for its removal for any
and all purposes whatsoever, including in particular the trans-
portation of coal from adjacent lands, so long as he operates
and uses the passages with due regard to the rights of the
surface owner."38
On the other hand, as pointed out by the court, the authorities
agree that, when the coal has been exhausted, the right terminates.
Since, in the case of ownership in fee, there is no time limit within
which the owner of the coal is required to remove it, the question
arises whether he can drive headings into his own coal and thence
into neighboring tracts, and postpone the removal of the residue
of his coal while operating in such neighboring tracts.
Generally, the cases hold that the right to use the tunnels
continues only so long as the coal conveyed is in good faith being
operated.39 -However, it was suggested, in a dictum in Armstrong
v. Maryland Coal Co.,-° that the owner of the coal could avoid this
result by leaving some of the coal unmined until the coal from the
a6 Id. at 246. The underlying principles are discussed in Simonton and
Morris, The Nature of Property Rights in a Separately Owned Mineral Vein,
27 W. VA. L. Q. 332 (1921).
87 128 Va. 383, 105 S. E. 117, 15 A. L. R. 946 (1920).
38 Id. at 388, 105 S. E. at 118, 15 A. L. R. at 949.
39 Note, 15 A. L. R. 957 (1921).
40 See 67 W. Va. 589, 608, 69 S. E. 195, 203 (1910).
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adjoining tracts had been removed.41 Further distinctions are sought
to be made upon the basis of whether the transportation system
rests upon the coal itself or upon the rock bed remaining after
removal of the coal.42
It is submitted that such legalistic quibbles are worthless as
decisive factors in the determination of the result to be reached.
The ultimate questioin is whether the owner of the strata other
than that consisting of the coal vein is being subjected to harm
for which the law should afford a remedy, either by way of injunc-
tion or by way of an action for damages. In attempting to arrive
at a conclusion, the courts have apparently thought it necessary
to reason syllogistically, thus: 1. Major premise: The owner of the
containing space has the exclusive right to use and occupy it;
2. Minor premise: The owner of the coal owns (does not own) the
containing space; 3. Conclusion: Therefore, he has (has not) the
exclusive right to use and occupy it. It is submitted that this is not
a sound approach to the solution of the problem.
In the normal large coal field, the vein extends horizontally
roughly parallel with the surface, taking into account dips, faults,
and the like. Thus, when the owner of the coal drives tunnels
into it, even assuming that he removes the top and bottom coal
completely, there remains a four-walled chamber, the two sides of
which are composed of coal indubitably owned by the owner of
the coal and the ceiling and floor of which (it may be conceded
for the purpose of argument) are "owned" by the owner of the
rock strata, upon the theory that having conveyed nothing but
coal, he retained all else. Since each of the contending parties owns
two of the four chamber walls, how can a court rationally deter-
mine that either "owns" the space contained within them, to the
exclusion of the other?
One can be said to "own" space only in the realistic sense and
to the extent that a court will recognize and protect a right to
exclude all others from it. If the coal owner is to be excluded, it
is not because a court has irrationally preferred the position of
the owner of the top and bottom of the four-walled chamber by
use of the solvent-words, "ownership of the containing space", but
because it recognizes that continued use of the chamber will or
4' This theory was examined and rejected in the Clayborn case.
42 The Clayborn case criticized this distinction.
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may result in harm for which a remedy should be provided. Since
the parties have not expressed their intentions, it is utterly un-
iealistic to decide the case by rules of thumb. When the owner
ot the fee conveys the coal and nothing else and waives no rights
to protection of the other strata, he nevertheless impliedly consents
to subject it to such damages (other than the removal of support)
as are necessarily incident to the removal of that particular coal;
but he does not consent that it may be damaged by operations
connected with the removal of other coal. By discarding the con-
cept of ownership of space, the courts could eliminate the idea of
the technical invasion of a property right 43-the "trespass" which
involves no real harm-and concern themselves with the ultimate
issue, is the surface being, or in imminent danger of being, sub-
jected to actual damage? If so, the court should protect the owner
. y injunction unless the harm is so inconsequential in comparison
with the lois which would be inflicted upon the coal owner as to
call for the application of the balance of convenience doctrine. In
such case, the surface owner can be adequately compensated in an
action" at law.
It must be observed that the "right to use" the pass-
ageways is not necessarily the equivalent of ownership thereof;
and it is an undecided question as to what conclusion would have
been reached in the Robinson case if the plaintiff had alleged
actual, present and continuing damage to his overlying strata. The
right of subjacent support might be involved, but not necessarily
so, since the damage might consist of vibrations, noise, etc., without
subsidence, rendering the use or occupancy of the surface less en-
joyable or valuable. The nature and extent of the mining rights
appurtenant to the coal are not reported. If the right to remove
adjoining coal was not expressly granted, then the case appears to
be rather strong authority that an express grant thereof is not
necessary. However, this authority is weakened by the fact that the
owner of the coal was also the owner of other strata above and
below it.
On principles of equitable estoppel, the use of a trestle and
tramroad constructed over the surface by the owner of the under-
lying coal for the purpose of transporting coal .mined on an ad-
43 This concept resulted in the award of an injunction in the Clayborn
case, although no actual damage was shown.
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joining tract will not be enjoined where the surface owner stands
by and permits such construction and use without objection." It was
intimated but not decided that the balance of convenience doctrine 5
might apply, even in the absence of an estoppel.46
'This doctrine was, however, applied in Chafin v. Gay Coal &
Coke Co.,47 in which the plaintiff owned a small tract of surface
which was subject to an easement for the removal of the underlying
coal leased by the defendant. The latter, while still continuing to
mine the leased coal as fast as possible, leased an adjoining tract and
operated it at the same time. The haulageway did not cross plain-
tiff's land but it was contended that the use of the buildings thereon
and the supply track constituted an additional burden which should
be enjoined. Upon the ground that such additional burden, if any,
was inconsequential, the action of the trial chancellor in denying
an injunction was affirmed, saving to the plaintiff the right to sue
at law for such damages. The court recognized the rule that the
owner of an easement cannot materially increase the burden on the
servient estate hence it becomes a question of fact in each case.4 8
The most important feature of the case was that the leased coal was
being mined as expeditiously as it would have been had there been
no operation on the adjoining tract. Thus the case inferentially
decides that the holder of an easement cannot stop or slow down the
mining of the coal to which it is appurtenant, thereby prolonging
its duration, and at the same time use the easement in connection
with operations upon other lands. Furthermore, since the right
of the owner of the servient estate to sue at law is saved to him, the
case must be viewed as an authority for the proposition that, in
the absence of an express grant, the owner or lessee of coal is
guilty of a legal wrong if he uses the surface easement appurtenant
thereto to any extent for the purpose of mining and removing coal
from other lands.
44 Beard v. Coal River Colleries, 103 W. Va. 240, 137 S. E. 7 (1927).
45 For a discussion of West Virginia materials including mining law
applications of this doctrine, cf. Note, 45 W. VA. L. Q. 155 (1939). In Green
v. Wheeling Independent Coal Co., 109 W. Va. 446, 155 S. E. 315 (1930), the
question of the right to use a surface entry for the removal of coal from
another tract was raised but not decided because of nonjoinder of necessary
parties.
40 See Beard v. Coal River Colleries, 103 W. Va. 240, 247, 137 S. E. 7, 10
(1927).
47 109 W. Va. 453, 156 S. E. 47 (1930).
48 Id. at 458, 156 S. E. at 49. Generally, as to the right to use the surface
in mining from another tract, see Note, 48 A. L. R. 1406 (1927).
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After the decision in this case, the plaintiff sued at law to
recover damages and it was held that, in the absence of proof of
actual damage, recovery is limited to nominal damages and that
evidence of a local custom to pay from one cent to two cents per
ton for the use of "front" lands for bringing out coal from "back"
lands is inadmissible because it relates to an unrestricted easement
rather than, as here, to a slight additional burden upon an ease-
ment already secured and located.49
It would seem, therefore, comparing this case with the Robinson
case, that a distinction is to be made between '(a) the right of the
owner of the coal to use the passageways in the coal itself for the
removal of adjoining coal and (b) the right to use the surface for
such purposes. In the former situation, the right being incident
to the ownership (query) of the space, there is no easement, i.e.,
right in the land of another, and the overlying strata is not a
servient estate. In the later, there is a true easement, the burden
of which upon the servient estate cannot be materially increased.
The conclusion seems to follow that, in order to escape liability at
law for trespass, the right to use the surface for the purpose of
removing adjacent or neighboring coal is one which must be
expressly granted, even though such use does not materially pro-
long or increase the burden upon the servient estate. In such cases,
equity will not intervene.
Frequently, in connection with an express grant of the right
to remove coal, it is provided that, if the grantee of the coal con-
structs tramways, tipples or other improvements, he shall pay to
the grantor an agreed sum per acre, "for each acre so used and
occupied". Such language has been held not to violate the rule
against perpetuities, since there is no postponement of the vesting
of an estate in the land.5 0
But, where the deed provides that the owner of the coal shall
pay a specified sum for each acre of land so used or occupied and
that the surface owner will execute a deed therefor in fee simple
when such surface is taken and paid for, the rule aganist perpetuities
is violated.51
49 Chafin v. Gay Coal & Coke Co., 113 W. Va. 823, 169 S. E. 485 (1933).
" he court cited and quoted from Springer v. J. H. Somers Fuel Co., 196 Pa. 156,
4b Atl. 370 (1900), limiting recovery to nominal damages against a tresspasser
using underground tunnels for the haulage of coal.
50 Post v. Bailey, 110 W. Va. 504, 159 S. E. 524 (1931).51 West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E.2d
46 (1947) (expressly distinguishing Post v. Bailey, supra n. 50).
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The most recent expression of the court is in a dictum in
Jeffrey v. Spencer-Boone Lan I Co.,5r in which there was an express
grant of the right to remove other coal. It was said,
".... The grant of the coal carried with it the rights and
privileges necessary for its mining and removal. The rights
granted added- nothing in that particular. The main purpose
accomplished was the creation of the right of hauling coal
from adjoining property."5 3
It will be noted that by this statement no distinction is made
between haulage underground and above ground-a distinction
which, as heretofore stated, is of great importance. It is possible,
however, that the right of underground haulage will be of no value
if the terminus of the way is an opening upon the surface as to
which such right has not been granted.54
There remain to be mentioned two other analogous cases. In
Robinson v. South Penn Oil Co.,55 in which a conveyance of surface
excepted the oil, with the right to drain salt water over the land,
it was held that such right was valid and binding as against the
lessee of a subsequent purchaser of the land, who could not recover
damages for injuries to sheep pastured thereon. In King v. South
Penn Oil Co.,56 the lessee of oil and gas was, under the facts of the
case, permitted to store oil on that part of the tract from which it
had not been removed.
2. RA noA SmiNGs
A railroad company may be compelled by mandamus to con-
struct and operate upon its right of way a side track and switch in
order that reasonable provision may be made by it for the trans-
portation of coal and coke for shipment, as required by statute;
and the extent thereof depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. 7 But a railroad company cannot be required to re-
construct and operate a side track, temporarily constructed and
52 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S. E. 292 (1932).
3 Id. at 363, 164 S. E. at 293.
54 Unless the coal mined from adjacent tracts can be brought to a pit mouth
or shaft opening which the operator owns, leases or otherwise has been granted
the use of, he cannot market the adjacent coal without trespassing upon the
surface.
5 112 W. Va. 114, 163 S. E. 857 (1932).
N8 110 W. Va. 107, 157 S. E. 82 (1931).
57 State ex rel. Mt. Hope Coal Co. v. White Oak Ry., 65 W. Va. 15, 64 S. E.
630 (1908).
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operated on land adjoining its right of way, under a verbal and
gratuitous permission of the owner of the land, when the privilege
is granted to terminate at the will of the landowner. 8
3. SUBJACENT SUPPORT
When coal is severed in ownership from the overlying strata,
either by grant of the surface and exception of the coal or by grant
of the coal and exception of the surface, the "natural right" to have
the overlying strata supported "in its natural state" is not sur-
rendered unless by express language evincing such intention.,, The
troublesome question is to determine what language is apt and
sufficient for the purpose.0°
The point first arose in West Virginia in the case of Griffin
Fairmont Coal Co.61 The plaintiff, owning the entire land from
the center of the earth upward, conveyed "all" the coal underlying
68 acres thereof to the defendant "together with the right to enter
upon and under said land and to mine, excavate and remove all
of said coal." ' Removal of the coal caused subsidence of the over-
lying strata, rendering the land useless for grazing and agricultural
purposes. In an action to recover damages, a recovery was denied,
the court holding that (a) there was no implied reservation of
subjacent support; (b) the doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas did not apply; and (c) the word "all" is unambiguous, and,
therefore, as a matter of interpretation, the plaintiff had expressly
waived the right of subjacent support.
The same result was reached twenty-eight years later in a
case 63 in which the surface was conveyed, excepting the coal and
the right to mine and ship all the coal, the court saying that the
holding in the Griffin case has become a rule of property in this
state. Judge Hatcher said:
"It is not conceivable that one who was purchasing or
reserving surface would deliberately covenant that all the coal
58 Malleable Coal Co. v. Potter, 89 W. Va. 214, 108 S. E. 900 (1921).
59 Note, 28 W. VA. L. Q. 149 (1922); cf. Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co.,
104 W. Va. 368, 140 S. E. 57 (1927).
60 Cf. Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va. 665, 97 S. E. 186
(1918) (coal deed construed).
61 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24 (1905).
62 Italics supplied.
63 Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 118 W. Va. 309, 167 S. E. 737 (1933).
39 W. VA. L. Q. 358 (1933).
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should be removed, if he were expecting the surface to be
undisturbed. It is just as unreasonable that one buying or
reserving coal would pay for or purport to reserve all the coal,
and go through the farce of writing into the deed the right
to remove all the coal, if he were contracting to leave the sur-
face inviolate. Both grantor and grantee would well know
that all the coal could not be removed, if the surface were
to be kept intact."64
The doctrine of the Griffin case is, however, confined to cases
in which the word "all" modifies the word "coal". Thus, in
Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke Co., 5 it was held that "a conveyance
of coal and all minerals, with the right of mining and removing
said coal and all minerals" does not extinguish the right of sub-
jacent support, expressly distinguishing the Griffin case.
Where there has been no waiver of support, the landowner
may recover damages for the killing of his horse which fell into
an opening caused by subsidence of the surface.66
In Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co.67 the severance deed
granted "all the surface land and only the surface". The coal was
515 feet below the surface and, after the coal pillars had been
removed, the plaintiff's water well was drilled in at a depth of 107
feet below the surface. There was no subsidence or breaking of
the surface but the mining operations resulted in a diversion of
percolating waters which supplied the well. The court held that
the rule of absolute support has no application where percolating
waters supplying a surface spring or well are diverted by mining
operations conducted in the usual way, unless the diversion occurs
in connection with a subsidence or fissure of the surface; if the
surface is supported the diversion is damnum absque injuria. It
is believed that this decision should be limited to its facts and that
it may be supported upon the ground that, since the plaintiff
owned only the "surface", i.e., the superficial part of the land, he
could not be heard to complain of injury to the strata lying 107
feet below it, which he did not own. It would seem further that
this situation should be distinguished from one in which A, owning
the entire land from the center of the earth upward, conveys to B
the coal only, without waiver of subjacent support. It is arguable
64 Id. at 312, 167 S. E. at 738.
65 89 W. Va. 55, 108 S. E. 491 (1921).
60 Cole v. Signal Knob Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 702, 122 S. E. 268 (1924).
67 104 W. Va. 368, 140 S. E. 57 (1927).
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in such a case that A would be entitled to support of all the over-
lying 515 feet of strata, including that containing the percolating
waters. But there are expressions to the contrary by the court
upon the theory that so to hold would deprive the owner of the
coal of the use of it.68 It is entirely possible that percolating waters
may be diverted by ordinary mining operations without any sub-
sidence of overlying strata and, in cases where the coal pillars have
been removed, it may be impossible to prove the fact of subsidence
if there is no visible evidence thereof on the surface. In either
case, the landowner is remediless.6 9
The question of support as between upper and lower veins of
coal has arisen in two cases. In Goodykoontz v. White Star Mining
Co.,70 a lease embraced two veins of coal. The operator began
mining in the upper vein but ceased operations and began mining
in the lower vein and pulling coal pillars, which resulted in the
seepage of water into the upper vein and an alleged loss of one
million of the two million tons remaining therein. It was held
that such threatened waste resulting from the negligence of the
lessee may be enjoined, and an accounting had for waste already
committed. The holding was supported on two grounds, (a) an
implied covenant by the lessee to protect, the lessor's reversionary
interest and (b) the right of subjacent support in the absence of
waiver thereof. Since there is nothing to show that the lessor owned
the surface or any strata other than the two veins of coal, the case
seems to establish the doctrine of subjacent support, as between
the upper and lower veins of coal, where there is a lessor-lessee
relationship. While Syllabus 2 qualifies the right to injunction
by the phrase "which may result from such negligence of the
lessee", it would seem that such operations should be held to be
ipso facto negligent. This point is of great importance concerning
the questions of whether the plaintiff would have to assume the
burden of proof as to negligence, whether the rule of res ipsa
loquitur would apply, and whether the defendant might justify
his conduct by proof of mining in a non-negligent manner. The
tenor of the opinion, and of points 3 and 4 of the syllabi, indicates
68 Id. at 376, 140 S. E. at 60.
69 Notes, 55 A. L. R. 1427 (1928), 109 id. 405 (1937). For a discussion of
liability for the removal of support as affected by conditions created by a
predecessor in title, see Note, 139 id. 1267 (1942).
70 94 W. Va. 654, 119 S. E. 862 (1923).
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that the liability of the lessee for damage to the upper vein is abso-
lute, that proof of negligence is not necessary, and that proof of due
care is no defense. The public interest in the conservation of
natural resources which are being rapidly diminished is a further
reason for so holding.
On the other hand, the destruction of the overlying vein can-
not be prevented if the owner of the lower vein has acquired the
legal right to do so. In Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-
Product Coal Co., 7 1 0, the owner, conveyed 'the lower Pittsburgh
vein to A, which leased it to D. .The deed contained an express
waiver of subjacent support for all overlying strata. Thereafter, 0
conveyed the upper Sewickley vein to P, which took with construc-
tive, if not actual, notice of D's prior rights. P began operations
in the Sewickley vein and later D began operations in the Pitts-
burgh vein, which resulted in subsidence and interference with and
damage to P's operations. The court held that D could not be
enjoined; that 0, having waived the right of support of the upper
vein, P as his grantee was in no better position. The only qualifica-
tion or limitation imposed is that the prior grantee mine the lower
vein in accordance with the usual and accepted mining methods
which are proper, economic and approved. Nor is it permissible
to prove that the owner of the lower vein could have altered its
mining methods so as to permit removal of the upper vein simul-
taneously. On first impression, the result reached seems harsh and
against the public interest but on further reflection the reasoning
of the court is unassailable. The owner of the lower vein has
bought and paid for the right to let down the upper vein. All that
iemains to the owner is the mere chance to extract it before it is
destroyed. He can convey no greater rights to his grantee, who, in
effect, buys the chance. The distorting feature of the case arises
from the fact that the grantee is actually operating in the upper
vein; but this could not enlarge his rights. If, as owner, he leaves
the vein untouched, his legal position is the same.
4. SuimmARY
It is apparent that the extent and character of mining rights
71 104 W. Va. 44, 188 S. E. 787 (1827); cf. Note, 84 W. VA. L. Q. 212 (1928)
(contending that the result reached was erroneous; that the interests of the
state in the conservation of natural resources should be considered; and that
legislation compelling mining so as to preserve the upper vein would be a
constitutional exercise of the police power).
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and privileges in a given case depend almost entirely upon its par-
ticular facts. If, by unambiguous language any specified right is
granted or withheld, there is no public policy which defeats its
enforcement, even though the public interest may seem to be ad-
versely affected. Concepts vary as to what is in furtherance of
the interests of the state as a whole. On the one hand, the idea
of the conservation of natural resources is at odds with the right
of the owner of a coal vein to consent to its destruction, as in the
Cjontinental case. On the other hand, decisions such as those in
the Robinson case and in the Chafin cases indicate a view that
full development and utilization of coal fields is to be encouraged.
If specific rights have been granted, it is an open question
whether all other rights are thereby excluded. The statement
in the West 'irginia-Pittsburgh case does not necessarily exclude
rights of a character similar to those expressly granted.
In the absence of specific language, the rights are such as are
reasonably necessary to the mining of the coal in a practicable man-
ner. Stripping rights will not be included, however, even though
the coal is not recoverable by other methods, unless stripping was,
at the time of the severance deed, a known and accepted mining
practice in that field. Over-extensive use of the surface beyond
the bare necessities of production and marketing will apparently
not be recognized. Whether, in a given case, this would include
the right to maintain a gob-pile has !not been decided.7 1
The right to remove adjacent or neighboring coal, either
underground or over the surface, is apparently viewed with liber-
ality; but the court is probably prepared to protect the landowner
if actual damage, to which he has not consented, is present or
imminent.
The doctrine of express waiver of subjacent support by use
of the magic word "all" is firmly established as a rule of property.
With this exception, the West Virginia cases are in harmony with
the general current of authorities.
72 The liability of a coal operator for damages arising out of the maintenance
of a gob-pile, adjudicated in Rinehart v. Stanley Coal Co., 112 W. Va. 82, 163
S. E. 766 (1932); cf. Note, 40 W. VA. L. Q. 371 (1934); and the right of
the public to enjoin the maintenance of a gob-pile as a public nuisance,
adjudicated in Board of Commissioners v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 122 W. Va.
442, 9 S. E. 2d. 813 (1940), are not within the scope of this article.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NoTE
The most recent decision involving strip mining is that of
Stone vs. Gilbert, 56 S.'E. 2d 201 (1949), in which the Court held
that:
"Where the owner of approximately two hundred sixty acres
of land executes a lease to the owner of twelve acres of coal under-
lying a part of the larger acreage which expressly gives to the coal
owner the right to enter in, upon and over the surface of the strata
overlying the coal owner's coal for the purpose of removing all of
said coal by strip mining operations and provides that the coal
owner shall have 'such additional surface as may be necessary or
convenient for such strip mining operations, and, in general, to do
any and all acts which are necessary or convenient for the removal
of all of said coal', and, further, gives to the coal owner the free
and uninterrupted right of way into, upon, over and under said
land at such points and in such manner as may be necessary and
proper for the purpose of mining such coal, 'without any liability
whatsoever from damage that may arise from the removal of any
or all of said coal, or the surface or sub-surface or other strata
overlying the same, or such additional parts of said surface as
nay be necessary or convenient in connection therewith', the
instrument creates such an interest in the surface of the land
on the part of the owner of the coal that he is vested with the
right to take and remove from the premises leased such part
or quantity of the surface materials as may be reasonable and
suitable for and necessary in the construction of a road or ramp
leading to the coal owner's tipple outside the leased premises where
it appears that the road or ramp and tipple are necessary for the
mining and marketing of the coal."
In a concurring opinion, Judge Fox took the position that
while the above quoted mining rights were very broad, they should
not be so construed as to include the right to take the surface of
the leased premises and use the same in creating a fill or road on
the premises of another; but that such rights should be limited to
the use of such surface materials on the leased premises.
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